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SHOULD MOVING IN MEAN LOSING OUT?
MAKING A CASE TO CLARIFY THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF COHABITATION ON ALIMONY
EMILY M. MAY†
ABSTRACT
As nonmarital cohabitation has skyrocketed over the last several
decades, courts and legislatures have increasingly struggled to decide
what legal effect an ex-spouse’s cohabitation with a new partner
should have on the receipt of alimony payments. In seeking to answer
this cohabitation question, states have taken a variety of approaches.
Often, however, courts’ answers to the cohabitation question are not
grounded in the rationale that those courts used to award alimony in
the first place and may therefore lead to inconsistent or absurd results.
This Note addresses the cohabitation question and argues that states
should revisit their current approaches in light of the multiple
contemporary theories of alimony and twenty-first century socialscience research on cohabitation. Ultimately, this Note proposes
several clarifications to existing law in order to provide a sensible,
workable rule that would introduce consistency to courts’
considerations of the cohabitation question.

INTRODUCTION
When Patricia and Andrew Craissati divorced in 2001, a Florida
1
court ordered Andrew to pay Patricia alimony for eight years. The
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1. Craissati v. Craissati, 997 So. 2d 458, 458–59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). This Note uses
the traditional term “alimony” to refer to post-divorce payments that are not part of the
distribution of property at divorce. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 85 (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“alimony” as “[a] court-ordered allowance that one spouse pays to the other spouse for
maintenance and support while they are separated, while they are involved in a matrimonial

MAY IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2012 9:38 AM

404

[Vol. 62:403

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

court directed Patricia’s alimony to terminate, however, if she
2
“cohabit[ed] with another person other than the parties’ child.”
Later, Patricia was sentenced to nine years in prison for driving under
the influence, causing serious bodily injury, and leaving the scene of
3
an accident. Andrew filed a petition to modify the alimony payments,
alleging that Patricia was “cohabiting” in violation of the original
4
court order because she shared her prison cell with a fellow inmate.
The trial court recognized that to construe cohabitation to
include a prison inmate would be “absurd” and “unthinkably
5
bizarre.” Instead, the trial court found that Patricia’s alimony should
be reduced because she had diminished financial need while
6
incarcerated. The appellate court, however, disagreed with the lower
7
court’s reasoning. It did not think that labeling Patricia as a
cohabitant was “absurd” because Patricia had stipulated in an
evidentiary hearing that her incarceration technically amounted to
8
cohabitation and that she had voluntarily driven under the influence.
The appellate court thus reversed the trial court’s decision and
9
directed the court on remand to terminate Patricia’s alimony.
Although Patricia needed less alimony because she was
10
incarcerated, she did not cohabit as the term is generally understood.
And although Patricia’s situation is unusual, she is not alone in losing

lawsuit, or after they are divorced,” and distinguishing it from property settlement, as
“[a]limony payments are taxable income to the receiving spouse and are deductible by the payor
spouse; payments in settlement of property rights are not”). More modern terms—such as
“spousal support” and “maintenance”—are generally synonymous this Note’s use of the term
“alimony.”
2. Craissati, 997 So. 2d at 459. The court incorporated the couple’s separation agreement
into its final judgment, and the separation agreement defined cohabitation as “the Wife living
with another person (not including the parties’ child) for a period of 3 (three) consecutive
months or more.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting the separation agreement).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 460.
8. Id. at 459–60.
9. Id. at 460.
10. As discussed in Part III, infra, courts and legislatures do not agree on one definition of
cohabitation. Generally, however, two people in a sexual or otherwise romantic relationship
must live together for a certain period of time without being married in order to be considered
unmarried cohabitants. Further, Black’s Law Dictionary defines cohabitation as “[t]he fact or
state of living together, esp. as partners in life, usu. with the suggestion of sexual relations.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 296 (9th ed. 2009).
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her alimony on the ground of cohabitation. As cohabitation outside
of marriage becomes both more prevalent and more socially
acceptable, courts increasingly confront the question of what legal
effect an ex-spouse’s cohabitation should have on her alimony
11
payments.
Legal scholarship, by contrast, has not addressed the question in
sufficient depth. Indeed, the social landscape has changed
12
dramatically since scholars first explored this topic in the 1970s. For
example, between 1970 and 2000, the number of cohabiting couples
13
increased tenfold. Although some recent work has addressed the
14
question as it applies to a specific state, academics have not
thoroughly explored the issue in connection with alimony’s
theoretical framework and twenty-first century social-science
15
research on cohabitation. Because alimony reform remains
16
ongoing, this topic is ripe for further discussion and debate.

11. This Note presumes that the typical alimony recipient is a woman. Although alimony is
available to both men and women, Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979), courts continue to
award alimony to women much more often than they award it to men, JOHN DE WITT
GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER & SHERYL L. WOLF, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 322 (3d
ed. 2005). Indeed, in 2010, 97 percent of alimony recipients were female. See U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics & U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and
Mean Income of Specified Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, and
Hispanic Origin, and Sex: Both Sexes, 15 Years and Over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032011/perinc/new09_001.htm (last updated Sept. 13,
2011) (reporting that 392,000 adults received alimony in 2010); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
& U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and Mean Income of
Specified Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, Hispanic Origin, and
Sex: Female, 15 Years and Over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
cpstables/032011/perinc/new09_013.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (reporting that 380,000
alimony recipients in 2010 were women).
12. Professor J. Thomas Oldham was one of the first scholars to address this question. See
generally J. Thomas Oldham, The Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation by a Former Spouse upon
His or Her Right To Continue To Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249 (1978) (addressing judicial
and legislative responses to the legal effect of cohabitation on alimony).
13. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Ciancio & Jamie L. Rutten, Modifying or Terminating Maintenance
Based on Cohabitation, 38 COLO. LAW., June 2009, at 45 (exploring the legal effect of
cohabitation on alimony in Colorado); Peter L. Gladstone & Andrea E. Gladstone, Codifying
Cohabitation as a Ground for Modification or Termination of Alimony—So What’s New?, 80
FLA. B.J., Mar. 2006, at 45 (discussing Florida’s enactment of a statute that addresses the legal
effect of cohabitation on alimony); Allan L. Karnes, Terminating Maintenance Payments When
an Ex-Spouse Cohabits in Illinois: When Is Enough Enough?, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 435
(2008) (exploring the legal effect of cohabitation on alimony in Illinois).
15. The social-science research on the frequency and duration of cohabitation as well as the
research on the extent to which cohabitation affects an alimony recipient’s financial need has
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This Note addresses the “cohabitation question”—the issue of
what legal effect an ex-spouse’s cohabitation with a new partner
should have on her right to receive alimony payments—and argues
that states should revisit their current rules in light of both the
multiple contemporary theories of alimony and the contemporary
social-science research on cohabitation. Part I discusses the history of
and justifications for alimony. Part II then presents social-science
research on cohabitation. Part III explores the relevant statutes and
case law across jurisdictions. Finally, Part IV identifies problems with
states’ current rules and proposes several clarifications. First, only if a
judge awards alimony based on need—as opposed to a different
reason—should cohabitation affect alimony payments. Second, states
should define cohabitation and financial need to avoid excessive
judicial discretion that can lead to inconsistent and absurd results.
Third, in situations in which alimony modification is warranted due to
an ex-spouse’s cohabitation, a judge should at most suspend, not
terminate, alimony payments. Although these changes do not answer
every aspect of the complicated cohabitation question, this Note
seeks to provide a necessary first step in exposing problems and
clarifying the law.
I. CONFLICTING THEORIES OF ALIMONY
Courts’ and legislatures’ responses to the cohabitation question
should be consistent with why courts award alimony in the first place.
This Part traces the historical development of alimony and explains
why alimony’s original justification does not apply to divorces in the
twenty-first century. It then analyzes the various contemporary
theories of alimony and how courts apply them. Finally, this Part
discusses the practical significance of these multiple theories.

implications for how courts and legislatures should respond to this question in the twenty-first
century. See infra Part II.A–B.
16. Advocates for change tend to support firmer limits on alimony payments. See, e.g.,
Jennifer Levitz, The New Art of Alimony, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2009, at W1 (“Long viewed as
payment for life, divorce settlements are facing strict new limits as some ex-spouses—primarily
men—protest the endless support of a former partner.”).
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A. Alimony’s Complicated History
The American conception of alimony traces back to England’s
17
ecclesiastical courts. Prior to 1857, there were two ways to end a
18
marriage in England: absolute divorce and limited divorce. Only an
act of Parliament could sanction an absolute divorce (divorce vincula
19
matrimonii), and such acts were incredibly rare. Ecclesiastical courts
20
could, however, grant limited divorces. Limited divorces, commonly
known as “divorce from bed and board” (divorce a mensa et thoro),
21
resembled modern legal separations. They thus did not end the
22
husband’s legal duty to support his wife. Given the husband’s
ongoing legal obligation after a limited divorce, the courts awarded
23
alimony to provide maintenance for the wife. Because the law
forbade married women from owning certain property, pursuing most
employment opportunities, and keeping the money they earned,
24
alimony often served as a necessary lifeline.
Ecclesiastical judges had significant discretion in determining
25
alimony awards. The wife’s need and the husband’s ability to
support her were the most important considerations in the
26
ecclesiastical courts. They also considered the husband’s degree of
17. Robert Kirkman Collins, The Theory of Marital Residuals: Applying an Income
Adjustment Calculus to the Enigma of Alimony, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 28 (2001); Chester
G. Vernier & John B. Hurlbut, The Historical Background of Alimony Law and Its Present
Statutory Structure, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 197 (1939).
18. Collins, supra note 17, at 28. Ecclesiastical courts could also annul a marriage based on
an impediment in existence when the couple married. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 197–
98.
19. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 198; see also GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at
262 (“[A]bsolute divorce, or divorce from the bonds of matrimony, . . . terminates the parties’
marital status.”). This type of divorce was granted only 317 times in the 150 years preceding the
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 85 (Eng.); Collins, supra note 17, at
28–29.
20. Collins, supra note 17, at 28.
21. Id. Courts granted this type of limited marital termination in cases of adultery and
cruelty. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 197.
22. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 619 (2d ed. 1988) (“The alimony which was awarded by the ecclesiastical
courts . . . merely constituted a recognition and enforcement of the husband’s duty to support
the wife which continued after judicial separation.”).
23. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 198.
24. Collins, supra note 17, at 29. The word alimony comes from the Latin term “alimonia,”
meaning sustenance. Cynthia Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the
Remarriage-Termination Rule, 81 IND. L.J. 971, 983 (2006).
25. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 198.
26. Id. at 198–99.
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fault in the dissolution of the marriage. Some ecclesiastical judges
increased the amount of alimony to punish a morally culpable or
28
delinquent husband. If a judge found that the wife had committed
29
marital misconduct, however, she generally did not receive alimony.
Additionally, judges freely modified alimony awards upon a showing
30
of changed circumstances.
When absolute divorce became more readily available after midnineteenth century reforms, English judges began frequently
31
awarding alimony in absolute divorce cases. The courts did not
provide a coherent theory, however, to explain why alimony should
be granted in an absolute divorce when the duty to support had
32
supposedly terminated. American courts likewise imported the
concept of alimony in the context of absolute divorce, but they faced
the same conceptual difficulty. American courts awarded alimony
without explaining why husbands, as opposed to the state, should
support their wives after the court terminated the husband’s legal
33
duty to support. Certainly, the state benefited from imposing this
duty to support because alimony reduced the possibility that the ex34
wife would become a ward of the state. Nevertheless, courts
awarding alimony continued to balance the wife’s need with the
35
husband’s ability to pay. And by the late 1930s, every American
jurisdiction, with the exception of South Carolina, had a statute
36
providing for alimony upon absolute divorce.

27. CLARK, supra note 22, at 619.
28. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 199.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 201.
31. Collins, supra note 17, at 30.
32. Id.
33. See id. (“The same inattention to theoretical consistency regarding support after a
severance of the marital bond appears to have marked the progress of alimony on this side of
the Atlantic.”); see also David A. Hardy, Nevada Alimony: An Important Policy in Need of a
Coherent Policy Purpose, 9 NEV. L.J. 325, 329 (2009) (“The analytical framework for alimony
began to lose constancy with the end of coverture and advent of absolute divorce.”).
34. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 195 (2011).
35. Id.
36. Vernier & Hurlbut, supra note 17, at 201. South Carolina did not provide for divorce
until 1949. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 161; see also Act effective Apr. 15, 1949,
No. 137, 1949 S.C. Acts 216 (allowing for “divorce from the bonds of matrimony”).
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During the early twentieth century, American judges based
37
divorce on fault, which provided a partial explanation for alimony’s
38
persistence. The number of official grounds for divorce varied
among the states, but all states that permitted divorce included
adultery as a ground for divorce, most awarded divorce on the
grounds of desertion and cruelty, and some awarded divorce for
39
nonsupport. Findings of fault affected whether, and in what amount,
40
courts awarded alimony. Indeed, similar to the historical practice in
England, the husband’s marital misconduct tended to increase the
41
wife’s alimony award, and courts generally did not award alimony to
42
“guilty” wives.
Over time, demand for divorce increased, and opposition to
43
“easy divorce” decreased. Although the official law of divorce
changed little in the first half of the twentieth century, “[s]lowly, a
44
kind of creeping no-fault system began to emerge.” Prior to the
advent of no-fault divorce, couples would circumvent statutory
restraints by lying about the existence of one of the statutory grounds
45
for divorce in their state. The statutory law began to catch up with
46
this collusive behavior in 1970. That year, California enacted the first
47
no-fault divorce statute. Other states soon followed, and all states

37. Id.
38. Starnes, supra note 24, at 985. Although the fault-based rationale could explain some
alimony awards, that rationale only explains why a “guilty” spouse would pay alimony to an
“innocent” spouse. Id.
39. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 161. The issuance of divorce in practice
sometimes differed from the statutorily accepted grounds and the articulated policy rationales.
See id. at 163 (“The formal official law . . . had absolutely no relationship to what was happening
on the ground. . . . [D]ivorce was a matter of routine—courts simply acted as rubber
stamps; . . . a messy system of lies and collusion was in effect; and judges, for the most part,
buried their heads in the sand.”).
40. Id. at 195.
41. Edward W. Cooey, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in the Award of Alimony, 6 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 213, 219–20 (1939).
42. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 195.
43. Id. at 163–64.
44. Id. at 172.
45. See id. at 167–68 (describing examples of such collusion, including faked evidence of
adultery, in New York).
46. See id. at 176 (“The legal story of divorce in the twentieth century was basically of how
this dual system decayed—at first rather slowly, then, after 1970, in almost a helter-skelter
rush.”).
47. Id.; see also Act of Sept. 4, 1969, ch. 1608, § 4506, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3313, 3324 (current
version at CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310 (West 2004)) (listing “[i]reconcilable differences” as a
ground for divorce).
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now have no-fault divorce. Alimony, however, survived the no-fault49
divorce revolution. On the one hand, alimony’s continued existence
makes little sense because no-fault divorce once again confirmed, at
least in principle, that divorce results in a clean break and thus
50
terminates a spouse’s ongoing duty to support. Yet, on the other
hand, its persistence is reasonable because property distribution and
alimony awards are closely related. Property distribution alone may
be inadequate to support an ex-spouse because many couples do not
51
have sufficient capital assets. Further, dependent spouses may have
a need for alimony regardless of whether fault is considered in
divorce proceedings. Indeed, divorce often results in “economic
52
disaster” for women.
In the twenty-first century, alimony statutes continue to
53
authorize judges to make awards in equity. Concurrently, however,
54
couples increasingly choose to craft separation agreements. These
agreements enable spouses to agree contractually on many different
55
issues, including property distribution and alimony. Although courts
historically reviewed these agreements with suspicion, they now
afford them substantial deference to promote more amicable
56
divorces.

48. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 177–78. New York, the last state to resist
the no-fault divorce movement, finally joined the other states in 2010. Id. at 178; see also
Domestic Relations Law—No Fault Divorce, ch. 384, § 1(7), 2010 N.Y. Laws Reg. Sess. 1169,
1169 (codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2010)) (allowing for divorce if
“[t]he relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at
least six months”).
49. Interestingly, twenty-two states still authorize judges to consider fault when
determining alimony awards. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 209; see also, e.g.,
Mani v. Mani, 869 A.2d 904, 917 (N.J. 2005) (“[W]e hold that to the extent that marital
misconduct affects the economic status quo of the parties, it may be taken into consideration in
the calculation of alimony.”).
50. Starnes, supra note 24, at 988.
51. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 26 (2002) (“Few divorcing couples have capital assets sufficiently
large to provide an adequate substitute for any but the most modest of alimony awards.”).
52. ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 96–97 (2006).
53. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 204.
54. Id. at 212. Today, at least half of divorcing couples use separation agreements. Id. at
213.
55. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 111.
56. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 213.
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And although courts award alimony less frequently than they did
57
in the past, they continue to award it in a significant number of
cases. In 2010, approximately 392,000 adults received alimony
58
payments. The median amount of alimony received was $8,279 per
59
60
year. Ninety-seven percent of alimony recipients were female, and
73 percent of female alimony recipients were aged forty-five or
61
older.
B. Alimony’s Various Contemporary Justifications
Many legal scholars and practitioners remain in favor of alimony
62
even though it lacks a dominant, accepted theoretical framework.
Nevertheless, scholars acknowledge that the law of alimony needs
theoretical justification in order to promote consistency and

57. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective Recognition of Gender Difference in the Law:
Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 23 (2008). Unfortunately,
comprehensive national data on the percentage of divorced women receiving alimony are
unavailable because the U.S. Census Bureau stopped collecting state data about divorce in 1995.
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 204. In 1990, 15.5 percent of divorced or separated
women were awarded alimony. GORDON H. LESTER, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF
COMMERCE, SER. P-60, NO. 173, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY: 1989, at 12 (1991), available at
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/popscan/p60-173.pdf.
58. See supra note 11.
59. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics & U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—
People 15 Years Old and Over, by Income of Specified Type in 2010, Age, Race, Hispanic Origin,
and Sex: Both Sexes, 15 Years and Over, All Races, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/
032011/perinc/new08_001.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011). The mean value received was
$12,993 per year. Id.
60. See supra note 11.
61. Of the 380,000 female alimony recipients in 2010, 220,000 were between the ages of
forty-five and sixty-four, and 58,000 were sixty-five or older. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
& U.S. Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and Mean Income of
Specified Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin, and
Sex: Female, 45 to 64 Years, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/
032011/perinc/new09_017.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (providing income statistics for
women between the ages of forty-five and sixty-four); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics & U.S.
Census Bureau, Source of Income in 2010—Number with Income and Mean Income of Specified
Type in 2010 of People 15 Years Old and Over, by Age, Race, and Hispanic Origin, and Sex:
Female, 65 Years and Over, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/
032011/perinc/new09_018.htm (last updated Sept. 13, 2011) (providing income statistics for
women sixty-five years of age or older); supra note 11.
62. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, at 24–25 (“At least in long-term marriages
one . . . finds a widespread view that marital dissolution should not dissolve all financial ties
between the former spouses if the result would be a significant disparity in the spouses’ postdissolution financial standing. However this apparent consensus exists only in very general
terms, and has produced no dominant theory to explain the alimony award.”).
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predictability. Some scholars continue to support the traditional
need-based rationale whereas some borrow from contract or
partnership principles. Others explain alimony as compensation for
economic losses. These theories exist simultaneously both in the
academic literature and, to varying degrees, in statutes and judicial
decisions.
This Note recognizes that courts award alimony for different
reasons in different situations and discusses the cohabitation question
within this complicated theoretical framework. Certainly, the
existence of multiple alimony theories is problematic because it may
lead to unpredictability and inconsistency, especially if courts and
scholars do not agree on when to rely on different theoretical bases
for awarding alimony. This Note does not, however, attempt to pick
one theory that courts should apply in all situations. The reality is that
courts and legislatures apply different theories in different contexts.
And indeed, the existence of different theories for different contexts
has some benefits. The detriments of one theory might have little
impact in one context whereas they could render an alimony award
inapposite in another context. An ex-spouse with a modest postdivorce income, for example, might not need alimony to provide for
basic expenditures, but she may have suffered economic losses as a
result of her marriage and therefore deserve compensation. The
advantages and disadvantages of each theory are thus important as
they indicate when judges might apply one theory instead of another.
The reason that a judge awards alimony is relevant to answering the
cohabitation question. What follows is a brief description of the
various theories courts reference in making decisions about alimony.
1. Need. Many courts and statutes continue to emphasize that
alimony depends on the financial need of the recipient and on the
64
supporting spouse’s ability to pay. Continuing to apply the need-

63. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“The absence of any systematic theory of alimony in modern divorce
law presents difficulties that extend to the law of marital property. The law of alimony needs a
justification that can support a law operating more consistently, more reliably, and more
predictably.”).
64. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.3A(a) (West 2000) (“The court shall award
alimony to the dependent spouse upon a finding that one spouse is a dependent spouse, that the
other spouse is a supporting spouse and that an award of alimony is equitable after considering
all relevant factors . . . .”); Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. 1983) (“[T]he court must
consider, among other factors, ‘the actual need and ability to pay of the parties . . . .’” (quoting
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (1980))).
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based theory in the wake of no-fault divorce makes some sense
because the specialization of labor within a marriage may contribute
to a spouse’s need upon divorce. A spouse who takes a less lucrative
job or puts her career on hold to care for children—even for only a
few years—will probably never recover her lost earning capacity and
65
may thus need alimony. If a woman divorces at a relatively young
age, she may have small children and still need to juggle work and
66
family. Alternatively, if an ex-spouse has been out of the workforce
for many years, prospective employers may find that she has little
market value because she has limited recent work experience outside
67
the home. Thus, because this theory focuses on the ex-spouse’s
68
financial need, ex-spouses who do not actually need alimony—even
if they incurred opportunity costs during their marriage—would not
69
qualify for alimony under this theory.
Critics of the need-based theory highlight two principal
difficulties. First, there is no clear definition of what level of support
70
satisfies “need.” Decisions variously conflate need with subsistence,
with a middle-class lifestyle, or with the prior marital standard of
71
living. Second, the need-based approach may not explain
satisfactorily why the ex-spouse, as opposed to the state or another
entity, should provide continuing support in the wake of no-fault
72
divorce.
2. Contract and Partnership. The contract and partnership
theories help to explain why the ex-spouse, as opposed to another
entity, should be obligated to support the other ex-spouse after a
65. Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts, and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 81 (1993);
see also Jacob Mincer & Solomon Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital: Earnings of
Women, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE,
CHILDREN, AND HUMAN CAPITAL 397, 415 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1973), available at http://
www.nber.org/chapters/c2973.pdf (noting that increased time spent at home results in a “net
depreciation of earning power”).
66. Starnes, supra note 65, at 82.
67. Id. at 81.
68. Collins, supra note 17, at 40.
69. This focus on need instead of on loss distinguishes the need-based theory from the
economic-damages approach discussed infra, Part I.B.3.
70. Collins, supra note 17, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ira Mark
Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1989) (“[T]he definition of ‘need’—the
most fundamental issue created by [alimony] statutes—is hopelessly confused.”).
71. Ellman, supra note 70, at 4.
72. Collins, supra note 17, at 40–41.
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divorce. The idea that ex-spouses deserve alimony based on one of
these theories is thus in part pragmatic. These theories borrow from
already-established legal principles. Both, however, have deficiencies.
73
The law generally treats marriage as a species of contract.
Indeed, the contractual rights and duties of spouses can be inferred
74
from the marriage vows. Although the specific rights and duties to
which the spouses contract may depend on each spouse’s subculture
and social class, the spouses essentially contract for future spousal
75
services. Parties to the marriage contract include not only the
76
spouses, but also the state. The state’s presence as a party explains
why it can confer duties and benefits as well as determine when the
77
marriage ends. The contract approach construes divorce as a breach
78
of the marriage contract and alimony as damages for that breach.
Unfortunately, contract theory may not provide justification for all
79
instances in which courts award alimony. Some scholars also say that
the contract theory’s conception of damages is problematic. The idea
that one party has breached the marriage contract does not easily fit
within the no-fault framework. And even if no-fault divorce did not
complicate this theory, the contract approach often does not prescribe
80
an appropriate amount or duration for alimony payments.
The partnership theory also adopts existing legal principles, but
it does not share some of the contract theory’s weaknesses. A
significant body of scholarship supports the view that marriage is an
81
economic partnership. According to one proponent, partnership
theory is a “richer” model than the contract approach and has
significant normative appeal because it is based on an egalitarian
82
framework. Under the partnership approach, divorce does not

73. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 33.
74. Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or “I Gave Him the Best Years of
My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 272 (1987).
75. Id. at 273.
76. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 33.
77. Id. at 33–34.
78. Collins, supra note 17, at 42.
79. Treating marriages as contracts may work better in cases in which the parties entered
into a written prenuptial agreement. Ellman, supra note 70, at 32. Indeed, some scholars
strongly criticize the contract approach in the absence of a written agreement. See, e.g., id. at 33
(arguing that applying contract principles “is no more than a concealed way of vindicating the
court’s own preferences” and only “purport[s] to follow the parties’ intentions”).
80. Collins, supra note 17, at 42.
81. Id. at 43 & n.94.
82. Starnes, supra note 65, at 119.
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automatically terminate the couple’s shared marital enterprise.
Rather, the spouse who earns less should receive a “buyout” because
83
divorce is a dissolution of the partnership. The analogy to a
partnership accounts for the specialization of labor within a marriage.
Critics note, however, that many of the default rules of business
84
partnership law may not apply to spouses. In practice, courts
generally do not explicitly apply partnership principles in divorce
85
proceedings.
3. Economic Damages or Compensation. This theory focuses on
the spouse’s economic damages that stem from the marriage itself.
The American Law Institute (ALI) adopted this basic idea: Alimony
serves as compensation for economic losses, not as payment for
86
future need. To a certain extent this approach may resemble the
partnership theory, but it does not share the same problems.
Although states have not officially adopted this theory as the
87
dominant framework, courts do apply it in some circumstances. For
example, a majority of jurisdictions emphasize the spouse’s economic
88
damages in “diploma dilemma” cases. In those cases, one spouse has
sacrificed career opportunities to support the other spouse’s schooling
but never realizes any financial benefits because the couple divorces
89
shortly after the other spouse graduates. Most states hold that the
spouse who sacrificed career opportunities has a right to be
compensated for her financial contributions to the professional

83. Id. at 139.
84. Ellman, supra note 70, at 40.
85. Collins, supra note 17, at 43.
86. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.02 cmt. a (referring to alimony as both a
“residual category” of financial awards unrelated to spousal support and as “compensatory
payments”). Scholars articulated economic-loss-based theories well before the ALI published its
recommendations. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL. STUD. 35,
63 (1978) (“The empirical results in this paper suggest that the alimony system, as administered,
acts to compensate wives for their opportunity costs incurred by entering and investing in
marriage. This interpretation of the economic function of alimony is directly opposed to the
common allegation that alimony is an ‘anachronistic’ manifestation of the wife’s dependency
upon her husband.”).
87. Hardy, supra note 33, at 334.
88. See, e.g., Guy v. Guy, 736 So. 2d 1042, 1046–47 (Miss. 1999) (“We adopt a similar
approach [to other jurisdictions], allowing the supporting spouse to be reimbursed for putting
the student spouse through school where the supported spouse obtained a degree and then
leaves the supporting spouse.”).
89. Downs v. Downs, 574 A.2d 156, 157 (Vt. 1990).
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education of the other spouse. Some courts have also applied a
compensation rationale when the ex-spouse has worked as a
91
homemaker in a marriage of long duration. Moreover, some alimony
92
statutes now explicitly recognize homemaker contributions.
4. Practical Implications.
As suggested by the preceding
discussion of the modern theories behind alimony awards, courts and
legislatures do not follow one model all the time. Pure “at law”
remedies—such as damages for breach of the marriage contract—do
not support awards in all situations in which alimony is awarded.
Alimony statutes thus incorporate significant discretion and often
blend alimony theories. Tennessee’s statute, for example, directs
courts to consider both need and homemaker contributions, among
93
other factors, in determining alimony.
This Note argues that the reason a court awarded alimony in the
first place should inform a subsequent decision to modify the alimony
award. This argument is grounded in two principal concerns. First, to
the extent feasible under a system in which judges award alimony in
94
equity, awards should be consistent to serve those equitable
purposes. The parties should understand why a court awarded
alimony and be able to predict under what circumstances payments
will end. The parties should feel that they are treated fairly when
compared to other divorcing couples. Second, without a theoretical
basis for their decisions, courts and legislatures may be more likely to
incorporate moral, rather than legal, judgments into their alimony
rulings. Thus, the justifications that courts use in awarding alimony
should be an important factor in determining the legal effect of

90. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Iowa 1989) (holding that a
spouse who supports the other spouse through professional school should be compensated);
Guy, 736 So. 2d at 1046–47 (same); Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa. 1990) (same);
Washburn v. Washburn, 677 P.2d 152, 153 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (same).
91. See, e.g., Clapp v. Clapp, 653 A.2d 72, 74 (Vt. 1994) (holding that “one purpose of
maintenance under [Vermont’s alimony statute, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 752(a) (1993)] is to
compensate a homemaker for contributions to family well-being not otherwise recognized in the
property distribution”).
92. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-5-121(i)(10) (2010 & Supp. 2011) (stating that courts
should consider “[t]he extent to which each party has made such tangible and intangible
contributions to the marriage as monetary and homemaker contributions, and tangible and
intangible contributions by a party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the
other party”).
93. Id. § 36-5-121(i).
94. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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cohabitation on alimony. The effect of specific theories on the
cohabitation question is discussed in Part IV.
Before proceeding, it should be noted that nearly every
95
jurisdiction terminates alimony payments if the recipient remarries.
Indeed, many state statutes explicitly authorize the termination of
96
alimony upon remarriage. Although the remarriage-termination rule
is outside the scope of this Note, it raises related questions. As long as
alimony remains need-based and tied to the spousal duty to support,
courts may have reason to terminate alimony upon a recipient’s
remarriage. To the extent that alimony is based on a different
rationale—be it contract, partnership, or economic-damages
theories—even the remarriage-termination rule may no longer be
97
justified.
II. DYNAMIC COHABITATION NORMS AND OUTDATED LAWS
Although cohabitation has traditionally been an uncommon
phenomenon in the fabric of American life, the frequency and
acceptance of cohabitation have risen dramatically since 1970.
Although most states no longer criminalize cohabitation, they also
generally do not afford significant legal protections to cohabitants.
Both the recent social-science research and the lack of legal
protections for cohabitants should influence how states answer the
98
cohabitation question.

95. CLARK, supra note 22, at 665.
96. Starnes, supra note 24, at 977; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327(B) (2007)
(“Unless otherwise agreed to in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the obligation to
pay future maintenance is terminated on . . . the remarriage of the party receiving
maintenance.”).
97. For a more thorough treatment of the remarriage-termination rule, see generally
Starnes, supra note 24.
98. Considering social-science data is especially desirable in this context. To understand
the practical effect any answer to the cohabitation question will have on ex-spouses, courts and
legislatures must understand the realities of cohabitation in the twenty-first century. This is
necessary because alimony rulings are always dependent on the realities of ex-spouses’ social
and economic relationships. Therefore, if courts adjust their understanding of the consequences
of cohabitation, as recent social-science research would suggest, see infra Part II, then courts
should also adjust their application of the various theories of alimony in the cohabitation
context, see infra Part IV.
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A. The Increasing Prevalence and Acceptance of Cohabitation
99

Scholars use various descriptions—from “meteoric”
to
100
“extraordinary” to “one of the remarkable social changes of our
101
era” —to convey the rise in cohabitation over the last few decades.
Although in the past the great majority of Americans either married
or remained single, the social landscape now looks markedly
102
different. Between 1970 and 2000, the number of cohabiting couples
increased tenfold: Whereas approximately 500,000 couples cohabited
103
in 1970, approximately five million couples cohabited in 2000.
In 2010, the United States Department of Health and Human
104
Services released a report that further documents this upward trend.
According to the report, half of all women and nearly half of all men
105
reported cohabiting at some point in their lives, and 9 percent of
106
adults were cohabiting in 2002. Moreover, the report documented
what scholars have recognized for years: Cohabiting relationships are
107
generally of short duration. After a few years, the cohabiting

99. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 121.
100. Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42
FAM. L.Q. 309, 314 (2008).
101. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2007).
102. Before the 1970s, cohabitants were considered “statistically and socially invisible.” Id.
at 4.
103. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 125. These numbers vary somewhat
according to the source, but the dramatic increase is well documented. Compare Garrison, supra
note 100, at 313 (“Between 1970 and 2000, the number of U.S. unmarried-cohabitant
households rose almost ten-fold, from 523,000 to 4,880,000.”), with Bowman, supra note 101, at
7 (noting the change “from fewer than 500,000 opposite-sex cohabiting couple households in
1960 to 4.9 million (almost ten million individuals)”).
104. See generally PAULA Y. GOODWIN, WILLIAM D. MOSHER & ANJANI CHANDRA,
NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MARRIAGE
AND COHABITATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT BASED ON CYCLE 6
(2002) OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH (2010), available at http://www.cdc
.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf (providing data on cohabitation and marriage in the
United States based on a representative sample of 12,571 men and women aged fifteen to fortyfour in 2002). The report defined cohabitation as “a man and woman living together in a sexual
relationship without being married.” Id. at 1.
105. Id. at 27–28 tbls.11 & 12.
106. Id. at 1.
107. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smock, Cohabitation in the United States: An Appraisal of Research
Themes, Findings, and Implications, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 3 (2000) (“[A]bout 55% of cohabiting
couples marry and 40% end the relationship within five years of the beginning of the
cohabitation. Only about one sixth of cohabitations last at least three years and only a tenth last
five years or more.” (citations omitted)).
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relationship usually terminates in one of two ways: either the couple
terminates their relationship or they marry, so they are no longer
classified as cohabitants. Only 31 percent of women and 24 percent of
men remained in their first cohabiting relationship for three or more
108
years. Only 16 percent of women and 13 percent of men remained
109
in cohabiting relationships after five years.
Although remarkably comprehensive in many aspects, the report
fails to account for the increasing rate of cohabitation among senior
citizens, who are most likely to have been awarded long-term or
110
permanent alimony.
Fortunately, another survey tracked
cohabitation among “older adults,” which it defined as people over
111
the age of fifty. In 2000, 1,088,428 older adults, who equaled 4
112
percent of the unmarried older adult population, were cohabiting.
And nearly 9 percent of unmarried adults between the ages of fifty113
one and fifty-nine were cohabiting. Moreover, as baby boomers
continue to enter this group, these percentages are expected to
114
increase.
There are several reasons why some older adults cohabit, even if
they did not do so earlier in their lifetimes. First, older cohabitants
may refrain from remarriage because their previous marriage ended
badly. Of all Americans over the age of fifty cohabiting in 2000, 71
115
percent were either separated from their spouses or divorced.
116
Second, older adults’ financial situations are often complicated.
They may want to preserve their assets for children from a prior

108. GOODWIN ET AL., supra note 104, at 34–35 tbls.18 & 19.
109. Id.
110. Alimony awards have shifted from being permanent support to being short-term
awards; permanent alimony is generally only available to women whose marriages endured for
many years. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 203–04.
111. See generally Susan L. Brown, Gary R. Lee & Jennifer Roebuck Bulanda, Cohabitation
Among Older Adults: A National Portrait, 61B J. GERONTOLOGY: SOC. SCI. S71 (2006) (using
data from the 2000 Census and the 1998 Health and Retirement Study to analyze cohabitation
among older adults).
112. Id. at S74–S75. Data from the Health and Retirement Study revealed slightly higher
percentages. Id. at S75.
113. Id. at S75.
114. Id. at S78.
115. Id. at S75 tbl.1.
116. Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family Law?, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
289, 313 (2011).

MAY IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

10/19/2012 9:38 AM

420

[Vol. 62:403

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

117

relationship instead of sharing those assets with a cohabitant.
Further, older adults may lose sources of income—such as certain
118
social-security and pension benefits—if they marry.
A major question is the extent to which cohabitants of all ages
become economically interdependent. Research indicates that
cohabitants financially support each other less than do married
119
couples. The extent to which cohabitants do become economically
120
interdependent, however, is debated.
This question demands
further research and has major significance for this Note’s discussion
of economic need in Part IV.
Finally, just as the frequency of cohabitation has increased
dramatically since 1970, social acceptance of cohabitation has also
increased. In the mid-1900s, cohabitation outside of marriage was
121
widely viewed as shameful. By the mid-1970s, however, attitudes
122
were changing—at least among young people. In 1981, 40 percent of
survey respondents approved “of men and women living together
123
without being married if they want to.”
Forty-five percent
124
disapproved. In response to a similar question in 2007, 55 percent of
125
respondents approved whereas only 27 percent disapproved.

117. Id. The cohabitants may also fear the emotional impact that a remarriage might have
on those children. Id.
118. Brown et al., supra note 111, at S72. Remarriage also generally terminates alimony. See
supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
119. Garrison, supra note 100, at 323.
120. Compare id. (“[Cohabitants] are much more likely [than married couples] to split
expenses instead of pooling their resources.” (emphasis added)), with Bowman, supra note 101,
at 23 (“It is true that cohabitants are somewhat less likely than married couples to pool their
income. However, a majority of both cohabitants and married couples do maintain joint
finances. . . . 55% [of cohabitants] do join their incomes.” (citation omitted)).
121. Garrison, supra note 100, at 311.
122. See Arland Thornton & Linda Young-DeMarco, Four Decades of Trends in Attitudes
Toward Family Issues in the United States: The 1960s Through the 1990s, 63 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1009, 1023 (2001) (“[I]n the mid-1970s more than half of all high school seniors reported
that a man and woman living together without being married were ‘doing their own thing and
not affecting anyone else,’ and almost another fifth said that cohabiting couples were
‘experimenting with a worthwhile alternative lifestyle.’” (citation omitted)).
123. PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 66
(2010), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families
.pdf.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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B. Outdated Cohabitation Laws and the Lack of Legal Protections
Historically, the law either ignored or criminalized
126
127
cohabitation. In 1962, the year when the Model Penal Code was
first published, a majority of states criminalized nonmarital
128
cohabitation. The Model Penal Code itself, however, did not
129
criminalize cohabitation, and in the 1970s and 1980s many state
bans were repealed or narrowed to target only public sexual
130
131
behavior. Yet a handful of statutes remain on the books.
Any bans that remain today—as well as any related laws that
penalize private sexual behavior between consenting adults—are
effectively void after the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence
132
v. Texas.
In Lawrence, the Court declared a Texas statute
criminalizing sexual activity between same-sex adults to be
133
unconstitutional. The statute at issue violated the petitioners’ right
to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
134
Amendment. This same right to liberty applies to heterosexual
cohabitants. Subsequent to Lawrence, the Seventh Circuit noted that
“[i]t is impossible to see how an unmarried heterosexual couple in a
long-term relationship could receive less protection [than a
135
homosexual couple].” When confronted with this issue, state courts
136
generally agree.
The extent to which the law otherwise protects unmarried
cohabitants, however, is limited. There is no comprehensive law of
137
cohabitation in the United States. In every American jurisdiction,

126. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 121.
127. MODEL PENAL CODE (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
128. Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex
Couples, 7 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 135, 141 (2005).
129. Id.
130. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 122.
131. Mahoney, supra note 128, at 147.
132. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
133. Id. at 578–79.
134. Id. at 578.
135. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, Ill., 483 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
136. See, e.g., Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, 2006 WL 3103008, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Aug. 25, 2006) (holding that North Carolina’s statute criminalizing cohabitation “violates
plaintiff’s substantive due process right to liberty as explained in Lawrence v. Texas”). Case law
on this issue is sparse, however, because enforcement of criminal cohabitation statutes is rare.
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 122.
137. Anna Stepieñ-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, The Legal Treatment of Cohabitation in
Poland and the United States, 79 UMKC L. REV. 373, 378 (2010).
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unmarried cohabitants have fewer legal rights and duties than do
138
married partners. Moreover, the law generally does not recognize
139
cohabitation as a legally significant status.
The Court’s holding in Lawrence and the persistent lack of
legally recognized protections for cohabitants have important
implications for the cohabitation question. First, Lawrence suggests
that termination of alimony based on a recipient’s post-divorce sexual
conduct is an unconstitutional punishment. Second, courts’ reluctance
to recognize a legal duty between cohabitants highlights the financial
uncertainty for an alimony recipient in a system where she risks losing
financial support from both her ex-spouse as well as from her current
cohabitant. This Note accounts for those constitutional and policybased concerns in proposing a solution to the cohabitation question in
the following Parts.
III. VARIATIONS, AMBIGUITIES, AND INCONSISTENCIES ACROSS
JURISDICTIONS
Rising rates of cohabitation and changing social mores have
increasingly led state courts and legislatures to consider the
140
cohabitation question. This Part details the current variation in case
law and statutes across jurisdictions. First, it highlights some factors
that affect how courts and legislatures answer the cohabitation
question. Second, it explains the majority rule in states without
specific statutory guidance. It then analyzes statutes that explicitly
address the cohabitation question. Finally, it explores litigation across
jurisdictions pertaining to what constitutes cohabitation and
diminished need.

138. Id.
139. Mahoney, supra note 128, at 158.
140. Historically, courts took one of two approaches. Some decided that an alimony
recipient’s post-divorce cohabitation had no effect on alimony payments because the law did not
recognize cohabitation as a legally significant status. See, e.g., Bowman v. Bowman, 79 N.W.2d
554, 561, 563 (Neb. 1956) (reversing the trial court’s alimony modification on the ground of
cohabitation because the relationship between the ex-wife and her new partner was
“meretricious rather than marital”). Other courts, by contrast, terminated an ex-wife’s alimony
as punishment for her “illicit” behavior. See, e.g., Weber v. Weber, 140 N.W. 1052, 1055 (Wis.
1913) (“[I]f the wife, without the fault of the husband, and without any adequate excuse or
palliation, deliberately chooses a life of shame and dishonor, has no other equitable claim upon
property in the hands of the husband, and he is compelled by his daily toil to earn the money
paid to her, the court may make the misconduct of the wife the ground for cutting off all
alimony, or for reducing the same as may, in its discretion, seem just and equitable under all the
circumstances of the case.”).
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A. Factors Affecting How Courts and Legislatures Respond
Decisions to modify or terminate alimony based upon
cohabitation are often grounded in fairness concerns. Some courts
specifically state two issues that arise when an alimony recipient
cohabits: (1) that an alimony recipient might unfairly receive financial
support from both her ex-spouse and her cohabitant, and (2) that an
alimony recipient might use her alimony payments to support her
141
cohabitant.
Because alimony recipients generally lose their alimony when
they remarry, courts fear that failing to terminate or modify alimony
upon cohabitation by an alimony recipient may discourage
142
remarriage.
Thus, some courts and legislatures may equate
remarriage and cohabitation in the alimony context in an attempt to
encourage remarriage.
Finally, whether explicitly noted or simply implied, moral
assessments may influence judicial and legislative responses. The
language in opinions and statutes sometimes reflects a negative moral
143
assessment of cohabitation. One ex-wife expressed frustrations that
likely extend to other alimony recipients in her situation: “I don’t
know why . . . I’m getting tarred and battered because I have a
144
boyfriend.” Although her ex-husband had lived with his second wife
145
before they married without any negative repercussions, the court
terminated the ex-wife’s alimony because she cohabited and failed to
146
overcome a presumption of mutual support. Moral assessments,
141. E.g., Austin v. Austin, 866 N.E.2d 74, 77 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
142. AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.09 cmt. a; see also Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 105
(N.J. 1983) (“We respect the concerns of commentators that this approach to cohabitation may
discourage marriage, at a time when human relationships have grown more and more
transient.”).
143. Georgia, for example, injects explicit moral distaste for cohabitation into its statute
when it describes the relationship as “meretricious.” See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-19(b) (2010)
(defining cohabitation as “dwelling together continuously and openly in a meretricious
relationship with another person, regardless of the sex of the other person” (emphasis added)).
For an example of a court decision that offers a negative moral assessment of cohabitation, see
Love v. Love, 626 S.E.2d 56 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). In Love, the court found that “[b]ecause the
State has ‘a compelling interest in promoting marriage and discouraging meretricious
relationships,’ a rule allowing alimony to continue when the supported spouse cohabits without
marrying is ‘illogical and offensive to public policy.’” Id. at 59. (quoting Croom v. Croom, 406
S.E.2d 381, 382 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam)).
144. Rester v. Rester, 5 So.3d 1132, 1134 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting Beth Rester) (internal quotation mark omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1137.
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along with other factors, affect judicial and legislative responses. The
next Sections address how courts and legislatures respond to the
cohabitation question.
B. Judicial Responses: The Development of the Majority Rule
Many states have not enacted explicit legislation pertaining to
the cohabitation question. In the absence of explicit legislation, courts
147
look to the general alimony statutes in their respective states. Two
statutory provisions often inform these courts’ decisions. First, most
alimony statutes provide for the modification of alimony upon a
148
showing of substantially changed circumstances. Second, many
statutes explicitly authorize the termination of alimony upon
149
remarriage.
A minority of states without statutes addressing the cohabitation
question automatically terminate alimony when the recipient
150
cohabits. These jurisdictions thus treat cohabitation and remarriage
identically in the alimony context. The majority of jurisdictions
without specific statutes, however, have rejected the rule that alimony
payments are automatically terminated upon a finding of
cohabitation. These states only modify or terminate alimony upon
151
proof that the cohabitation has resulted in diminished need. In
152
Garlinger v. Garlinger, a New Jersey court articulated a need-based
153
test that became the majority rule. The Garlinger court rejected an
automatic-termination rule but held that cohabitation constituted a
relevant factor in determining whether to modify alimony
147. A majority of states authorize modification of alimony by statute in certain
circumstances. GREGORY ET AL., supra note 11, at 322–23.
148. Id.; see also, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-327(A) (2007) (“[T]he provisions of any
decree respecting maintenance or support may be modified or terminated only on a showing of
changed circumstances that are substantial and continuing . . . .”).
149. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
150. AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.09 cmt. a; see also, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-55
(LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon proof that the spouse receiving alimony “is living
openly or cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex”).
151. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 892 A.2d 175, 182 (Vt. 2005) (“The majority rule in
jurisdictions without a specific statute is that cohabitation by the recipient spouse can result in
reduction or elimination of a maintenance award only if it improves the financial circumstances
of the recipient spouse enough to substantially reduce the need for maintenance.”).
152. Garlinger v. Garlinger, 347 A.2d 799 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
153. See Gayet v. Gayet, 456 A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. 1983) (“[T]he majority of jurisdictions have
adopted an economic needs test . . . clearly defined in Garlinger . . . [and] used by other courts.”
(quoting Lillian Hamor, Note, The Effect of Third Party Cohabitation on Alimony Payments, 15
TULSA L.J. 772, 779 (1980))).
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154

payments. Under Garlinger, if the alimony recipient is financially
supported by her cohabitant or uses her alimony payments to support
155
her cohabitant, a court may modify or terminate alimony. This
approach recognizes that courts should not decrease alimony when
the cohabitation does not affect the alimony recipient’s financial
need.
At its core, the need-based test seeks to balance conflicting
interests. Courts recognize the concern that alimony recipients could
choose cohabitation instead of marriage in order to continue
156
receiving alimony. At the same time, however, states are also
concerned with “individual privacy, autonomy, and the right to
157
develop personal relationships free from governmental sanctions.”
Moreover, an alimony recipient would be unprotected if her alimony
158
were terminated and her cohabitation subsequently ended. By
focusing on financial need, majority-rule jurisdictions seek to reject
the “model of domestic relations that provided women with security
159
in exchange for economic dependence and discrimination.”
Majority-rule jurisdictions, however, struggle with defining financial
160
need as well as defining cohabitation.
Some courts may decide that some questions are better left to
the legislative branch and refrain from making policy determinations
related to the need-based test, such as whether to presume that the
cohabitation diminished the alimony recipient’s need. At least one
court has explicitly called for legislative action:
[A]ny changes in such declared policy must originate in the
legislature. A number of states—most notably California, Illinois,
and New York—have enacted statutes that specifically deal with this

154. Garlinger, 347 A.2d at 803.
155. Id.
156. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
157. Gayet, 456 A.2d at 103.
158. See Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 765 (Nev. 1998) (“[T]he test . . . recognizes the fact
that a recipient spouse may be left largely unprotected, from an economic standpoint, if he or
she breaks off a relationship with a cohabitant.”). This concern is particularly worrisome
because states created alimony in part to prevent ex-spouses from becoming wards of the state.
Id.
159. Gayet, 456 A.2d at 104 (quoting Lepis v. Lepis, 416 A.2d 45, 54 (N.J. 1980)) (internal
quotation mark omitted).
160. See infra Part III.D–E.
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problem. If changes in Arizona law are desirable, they should be left
161
to legislative action and not to the courts.

C. Varied Legislative Responses
Unlike the jurisdictions without specific statutes, some
legislatures explicitly address the cohabitation question. These
statutes vary widely. And although legislative guidance should direct
courts in this area, these statutes are in reality often no more clear
than the rules laid down by the common-law decisions they replace.
1. Disagreement over the role of financial need. A number of
statutes follow the automatic-termination rule and thus direct courts
to terminate alimony upon cohabitation without regard to a change in
162
financial need.
Some of these statutes expressly analogize
cohabitation to marriage and include both relationships in the same
163
clause.
California does not terminate alimony automatically, but it
assumes that the cohabitation has decreased the alimony recipient’s
financial need: “Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in
writing, there is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of
proof, of decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is
164
cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex.” If the court

161. Smith v. Mangum, 747 P.2d 609, 612 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).
162. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon proof that
the spouse receiving alimony is cohabiting); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009 &
Supp. 2012) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.9(b) (West 2000) (same); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-3-150 (1985 & Supp. 2011) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(10) (LexisNexis 2007
& Supp. 2012) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(A) (2008) (terminating alimony upon proof
that the spouse has cohabited for a year or more).
163. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(A) (2008) (terminating alimony, subject to two
limited exceptions, when “the spouse receiving support has been habitually cohabiting with
another person in a relationship analogous to marriage for one year or more”); see also ALA.
CODE § 30-2-55 (LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon “proof that the spouse receiving
such alimony has remarried or that such spouse is living openly or cohabiting with a member of
the opposite sex”).
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 2004). This Note sometimes discusses California’s
approach to various facets of the cohabitation question—even though California departs from
the approaches taken by other states—for two principal reasons. First, California was the first
state to enact a no-fault divorce statute, and other states followed. See supra notes 47–48 and
accompanying text. Second, California has taken “dramatic step[s]” in addressing certain
marriage-law and cohabitation issues before other states have taken such steps. See GROSSMAN
& FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 10 (“The next dramatic step began, as usual, in California, in the
famous case of Marvin v. Marvin[, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (en banc)].”). In essence, the
California Supreme Court recognized that contracts between cohabitants to share any money
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determines that circumstances have changed, it may modify or
165
terminate alimony. This statute thus gives courts some leeway when
the recipient establishes that the circumstances do not result in
diminished need.
Other statutes direct courts to intervene only if the cohabitation
has actually resulted in diminished financial need—endorsing the
166
majority rule in these jurisdictions without statutes. Connecticut, for
example, authorizes its courts to modify or terminate alimony
“because the living arrangements cause such a change of
167
circumstances so as to alter the financial needs of that party.”
Likewise, Oklahoma courts may modify or terminate alimony upon
changed circumstances “relating to [the] need for support or ability to
168
support.” These statutes, however, do not indicate what constitutes
diminished need. Further, many statutes do not elucidate whether the
alimony payments should only be modified by the amount of a
demonstrated change in need or whether cohabitation should itself
serve as a signal that the recipient no longer needs support.
2. Conflicting definitions of cohabitation. The other major issue
faced by courts interpreting cohabitation statutes is defining
cohabitation with precision. Statutes that use the term “cohabitation”
vary widely in whether they define it and, if they do, how they define
it. Other statutes do not use the term at all, referring to it by another
name.
States that define cohabitation in their statutes differ in how
specifically they define the term. North Carolina, an automatic-

and property could be legally enforced, Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110, which “caused a stir in legal
circles, was widely reported in the papers, and was a topic of nervous humor on talk shows and
in magazines.” GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, at 10.
165. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 2004).
166. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (authorizing
superior courts to modify, suspend, or terminate alimony upon a showing that the recipient “is
living with another person under circumstances which the court finds should result in the
modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because the living arrangements
cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of that party”); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.14(1)(b)(1) (West 2012) (authorizing the court to reduce or terminate alimony upon
proof that “a supportive relationship has existed between the obligee and a person with whom
the obligee resides”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 134(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012) (granting
the court the power to reduce or terminate alimony payments if cohabitation is alleged and
there is “proof of substantial change of circumstances of either party to the divorce relating to
need for support or ability to support”).
167. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86(b) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
168. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 134(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012).
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termination state, defines cohabitation as “the act of two adults
dwelling together continuously and habitually in a private
heterosexual relationship even if this relationship is not solemnized
169
by marriage, or a private homosexual relationship.” In North
Carolina, evidence of cohabitation includes “the voluntary mutual
assumption of those marital rights, duties, and obligations which are
usually manifested by married people, and which include, but are not
170
necessarily dependent on, sexual relations.”
Other statutory definitions provide less guidance for the courts
but still highlight certain factors. Several statutes emphasize that the
171
cohabitation must be continuous. South Carolina’s statute provides
the most straightforward definition of continuity: “continued
cohabitation” signifies “a period of ninety or more consecutive
172
days.” Some states also require that cohabitation involves a
173
conjugal relationship. South Carolina does not state that the
relationship must resemble marriage, but it does note that it must be
174
“romantic.” Instead of defining cohabitation, California only states
what the term does not require. In California, the couple need not
175
hold themselves out as husband and wife.
Finally, some state legislatures that did not address the
cohabitation question in the past have recently clarified their
definitions of cohabitation. In 2011, the governor of Massachusetts
176
signed an alimony-reform act that took effect in 2012. The statute
provides that “[g]eneral term alimony shall be suspended, reduced or

169. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.9(b) (West 2000).
170. Id. North Carolina’s discussion of what constitutes evidence of cohabitation closely
resembles the definition of cohabitation from the sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary. See
infra note 189 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/510(c) (West 2009 & Supp. 2012) (terminating
alimony when the recipient “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal
basis”).
172. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-150 (1985 & Supp. 2001). Further, South Carolina’s statute
prevents couples from evading the ninety-day requirement. See id. (“The court may determine
that a continued cohabitation exists if there is evidence that the supported spouse resides with
another person in a romantic relationship for periods of less than ninety days and the two
periodically separate in order to circumvent the ninety-day requirement.”).
173. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 134(C) (West 2001 & Supp. 2012) (“[C]ohabitation
means the dwelling together continuously and habitually of a man and a woman who are in a
private conjugal relationship not solemnized as a marriage . . . .”); supra note 171.
174. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-150 (1985 & Supp. 2011).
175. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(2) (West 2004).
176. Act effective Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 124, 2011 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis) (codified
at MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012)).
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terminated upon the cohabitation of the recipient spouse when the
payor shows that the recipient spouse has maintained a common
household . . . with another person for a continuous period of at least
177
3 months.” A “common household” means that a couple “share[s] a
178
primary residence together with or without others.” The statute also
provides that courts may reinstate alimony that was suspended,
reduced, or terminated on the ground of cohabitation if the
cohabitation ends before the termination date in the original court
179
order.
Statutes that do not use the term cohabitation vary in what terms
they use instead. Connecticut, for example, employs the phrase
180
“living with another person.” And New York, the first state to enact
181
a statute explicitly addressing the cohabitation question, directs its
courts to ask whether “the wife is habitually living with another man
and holding herself out as his wife, although not married to such a
182
183
man.” Florida’s cohabitation statute, enacted in 2005, likewise
184
does not use the term cohabitation. It provides an extensive, but not
exhaustive, list of relevant factors in assessing whether a “supportive
185
relationship” sufficient to modify or terminate alimony exists. One
factor is the extent to which the recipient and her partner “have held

177. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-86 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012).
181. Prior to the 1970s, only New York had enacted a statute addressing cohabitation by an
alimony recipient. J. Thomas Oldham, Cohabitation by an Alimony Recipient Revisited, 20 J.
FAM. L. 615, 620–21 (1982). New York enacted its statute in 1938. Act of Mar. 26, 1938, ch.
161, § 1159, 1938 N.Y. Laws 682, 682–83 (current version at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW (McKinney
2010)).
182. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 2010). Some statutes explicitly note that
alimony is only affected if the recipient is cohabiting with someone of the opposite sex. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (LexisNexis 2011) (terminating alimony upon proof that the spouse
receiving alimony “is living openly or cohabiting with a member of the opposite sex”); CAL.
FAM. CODE § 4323 (West 2004) (creating a rebuttable presumption of decreased need for
alimony if the recipient is “cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex”). But see GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-6-19 (2010) (“‘[C]ohabitation’ means dwelling together . . . with another person,
regardless of the sex of the other person.” (emphasis added)).
183. Act effective June 10, 2005, ch. 2005-168, § 1(b), 2005 Fla. Laws 1726, 1727 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.14(1)(b) (West 2012)). The 2005 enactment essentially
codified the existing case law in Florida on the cohabitation question. Gladstone & Gladstone,
supra note 14, at 45.
184. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.14(1)(b) (West 2012).
185. Id. § 61.14(1)(b)(2).
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themselves out as a married couple.” Other relevant factors include
the length of time that the couple has resided together “in a
permanent place of abode,” their “financial interdependence,” the
extent to which they have “supported” each other, any “property
sharing or support” agreement, whether they have “worked together
to create or enhance anything of value,” whether they have purchased
property together, and whether they have supported each other’s
187
children.
D. Problems Defining Cohabitation in Litigation
States with specific statutes on the cohabitation question and
states with common-law rules face similar problems in litigation.
Litigation that touches upon the cohabitation question often turns on
whether the recipient indeed “cohabited.” Generally, parties disagree
about two issues: first, what constitutes living together, and second,
what facts in addition to common residency are required for courts to
make a finding of cohabitation.
As a threshold matter, courts do not agree on whether the term
188
cohabitation has a plain meaning. Courts referring to the term’s
ordinary meaning have relied on the definition of cohabitation in the
sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary: “to live together as husband
and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and
obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including
189
but not necessarily dependent on sexual relations.” Webster’s Third
New International Dictionary offers a similar definition: “to live
together as husband and wife usually without a legal marriage having

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Some jurisdictions hold that the term cohabitation—without an explicit provision in the
separation agreement or a stipulation by the parties—is ambiguous and lacks a plain meaning.
See, e.g., Graev v. Graev, 898 N.E.2d 909, 914 (N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he word ‘cohabitation’ is
ambiguous . . . neither the dictionary nor New York case law supplies an authoritative or ‘plain’
meaning. Similarly, courts in other states have not ascribed a uniform meaning to the word
‘cohabitation’ as used in separation agreements.” (citation omitted)). Other courts, by contrast,
have held that cohabitation does have an ordinary, plain meaning. See, e.g., Adamson v.
Adamson, 958 S.W.2d 598, 600–01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (relying on the term’s plain meaning and
holding “that when a man and woman spend as much time together as their respective jobs
allow, regularly engage in sexual relations . . . , purchase a home together,” and engage in other
similar activities, “such people are ‘cohabiting’ as that word is understood by reasonable
people”).
189. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 566 N.W.2d 806, 811 (N.D. 1997) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 260 (6th ed. 1990)).

MAY IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE COHABITATION QUESTION

10/19/2012 9:38 AM

431

190

been performed.” Courts less frequently cite other definitions of the
term that do not include an analogy to marriage; they “defin[e]
cohabitation as merely living together in a sexual or intimate
191
relationship.”
1. Residency. Regardless of whether courts determine that the
term cohabitation has a plain meaning, courts often struggle to
determine to what extent the couple must live together and for how
long. Some courts do not require that couples reside together
continuously, which leads to the problem that some casual dating
relationships may be construed as cohabitation. When couples stay
together at most five times a week, some courts find that the couple
192
193
cohabited. Similarly, in In re Marriage of Susan, an appellate court
affirmed that a couple that maintained separate residences and that
194
did not share expenses had cohabited. The Susan court emphasized
that the couple dated for several years, often spent the night together,
195
vacationed together, and spent holidays together.
196
South Carolina’s ninety-day requirement, by contrast, provides
clear guidance to courts so that judges are not forced to weigh the
exact number of overnight stays that tips the scale in favor of a
finding of cohabitation. Thus, applying its statute in a recent case, a
South Carolina court found that a couple did not cohabit because
197
“they did not spend ninety consecutive nights together.”

190. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 440 (1971)).
191. Smith v. Smith, 769 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Mich. 2008) (Corrigan, J., dissenting) (citing four
dictionaries that offer such a definition).
192. See, e.g., Rehm v. Rehm, 409 S.E.2d 723, 724 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the trial
court’s conclusion that the couple cohabited based on the trial court’s finding that the couple
stayed over as many as five nights per week, that the couple kissed goodbye at the door, that the
couple took overnight vacations of more than one night, and that the parties had an exclusive,
monogamous relationship). In some circumstances, however, courts may find cohabitation even
when an unmarried couple does not live together continuously but otherwise acts as a
cohabiting couple. See, e.g., Adamson v. Adamson, 958 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding cohabitation as a matter of law when a couple “spend[s] as much time together as their
respective jobs allow, regularly engage in sexual relations when they are together, purchase a
home together (taking title as joint tenants), and sign a deed of trust declaring their intention to
‘occupy, establish and use the [p]roperty as [their] principal residence’” (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting the deed)).
193. In re Marriage of Susan, 856 N.E.2d 1167 (Ill. Ct. App. 2006).
194. Id. at 1170–71.
195. Id.
196. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
197. Biggins v. Burdette, 708 S.E.2d 237, 239 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011).
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2. Additional elements. Aside from determining the frequency of
overnight stays that constitutes living together, courts also wrestle
with what additional elements are required to constitute cohabitation.
Not requiring additional elements leads to absurd results. In the
198
Florida case Craissati v. Craissati, described in the Introduction, an
appellate court held that Patricia had cohabited with her cellmate in
199
prison and thus terminated her alimony. In that case the court
200
required nothing more than the ex-wife sharing a prison cell. As a
general rule, courts have recognized that more than living together is
required; otherwise, mere roommates would constitute cohabitants,
and alimony recipients would be forced to live in isolation to receive
201
alimony.
Courts disagree on the importance of sexual relations in
determining whether a couple cohabited. Some require sexual
202
203
conduct. Others do not. Requiring sexual conduct prevents courts
from classifying a mere roommate relationship as cohabitation.
Making it a required element, however, would mean that if a couple
indeed has a relationship akin to that of married partners, but does
not have sex—if, for example, the male cohabitant is impotent—then
204
the court would not find that they are cohabitants.
Nor is it clear that requiring a sexual relationship in any
definition of cohabitation brings courts closer to a coherent approach.
There are certainly circumstances in which two people live together
and have sex, but where few would consider the relationship to
constitute cohabitation. A 2011 case illustrates this point. In Myers v.
198. Craissati v. Craissati, 997 So. 2d 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
199. Id. at 460.
200. Id. (Klein, J., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Molloy, 635 P.2d 928, 930 (Colo. App. 1981) (holding that
the ex-wife was not cohabiting because “there was no evidence of a sexual relationship, a
romantic involvement, or even a homemaker-companion relationship” between the ex-wife and
her cotenant); Austin v. Austin, 866 N.E.2d 74, 79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
cohabitation did not occur because the recipient’s “living arrangement [wa]s nothing more than
a business relationship”).
202. See, e.g., Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 674 (Utah 1985) (“‘[C]ohabitation’ means
to dwell together in a common residence and to participate in sexual contact that evidences a
larger conjugal relationship.”).
203. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sappington, 478 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ill. 1985) (“We believe
that when two people live together . . . it is the husband-and-wife-like relationship which bears
the rational relationship to the need for support, not the absence or presence of sexual
intercourse.”).
204. Cf. id. (holding that it is possible for an impotent male to cohabit and clarifying that
under Illinois law a conjugal relationship does not require sexual conduct).

MAY IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

10/19/2012 9:38 AM

THE COHABITATION QUESTION

433

205

Myers, the alimony recipient moved into her parents’ home, at least
part time, and commenced an allegedly sexual relationship with her
206
parents’ teenage foster son. The trial court held that the two
requirements for cohabitation were met under Utah law: (1) the
couple shared a common residence, and (2) the alimony recipient
207
failed to carry her burden proving the lack of sexual conduct. The
Court of Appeals subsequently reversed, holding that the two lacked
a relationship akin to marriage, even if they occupied the same
208
household and engaged in sexual conduct. The Supreme Court of
Utah affirmed, explaining that
[t]he ultimate question in this case was whether Ms. Meyers and [the
foster child] were cohabiting, and Mr. Myers bore the burden on
that issue. The existence of an intimate sexual relationship was
relevant to the statutory inquiry, but Ms. Myers bore no specific
burden of disproving it. Instead, it was Mr. Myers’s burden to
establish cohabitation by a preponderance of the evidence, and both
parties were entitled to present—and did present—evidence they
209
deemed relevant to that inquiry.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Utah
recognized the unique circumstances in Myers. Even if the ex-wife
had a sexual relationship with her parents’ teenage foster son, finding
cohabitation in Myers would not have served the underlying purpose
210
of Utah’s approach to the cohabitation question. Indeed, this case
neither resembled a marriage-like arrangement nor a relationship
that resulted in diminished financial need on the part of the alimony
recipient.

205. Myers v. Myers, 266 P.3d 806 (Utah 2011).
206. Id. at 807. Ms. Myers denied that she had a sexual relationship with her parents’
teenage foster son, and there was no direct evidence to contradict her assertion. Her exhusband, however, used circumstantial evidence to suggest the existence of a sexual
relationship. Id. at 807–08.
207. Id. at 808.
208. Myers v. Myers, 231 P.3d 815, 819 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 266 P.3d 806 (Utah
2011).
209. Myers, 266 P.3d at 812.
210. Id. at 809, 813–14 (“Even if Ms. Myers and M.H. had a sexual relationship and lived
together under the same roof, their relationship had almost none of the other hallmarks of a
marriage. . . . Their relationship may eventually have led to sexual intimacy, but that alone is
insufficient to establish cohabitation.”).
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E. Problems Defining Diminished Need in Litigation
In jurisdictions that do not automatically terminate alimony if
the recipient cohabits, litigation centers not only on the definition of
cohabitation but also on the definition of diminished financial need.
In addition, issues arise regarding who bears the burden of proof.
Courts applying the need-based test generally do not modify
alimony when an alimony recipient’s cohabitant incidentally benefits
211
from fixed expenses that the alimony recipient pays. For example,
although a cohabitant may benefit from an alimony recipient’s
expenditure on heating in a shared residence, the cost of heat would
remain constant even if the alimony recipient lived alone, and thus
this expenditure does not indicate that the court should modify
212
alimony. Indeed, the fact that a cohabitant may benefit from an
alimony recipient’s payment of fixed expenses does not indicate that
the ex-spouse herself has experienced any decrease in financial
213
need.
Whether sharing household expenses that are not fixed
constitutes a change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduction
in alimony payments, however, has engendered debate. Some states
hold that if an alimony recipient purchased a cohabitant’s food, it
would be possible to find that she did not need that portion of her
214
alimony. Similarly, some courts consider whether an alimony
215
recipient’s cohabitant performs house maintenance and repairs. The
Vermont Supreme Court, however, has disagreed and has stated that
“even if the new partner contributed equally to the expenses of the
household, [the court] would not hold . . . that this alone is a

211. See, e.g., Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 765 (Nev. 1998) (“Shared living
arrangements, unaccompanied by evidence of a decrease in the actual financial needs of the
recipient spouse, are generally insufficient to call for alimony modification.”).
212. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1143 (Me. 1980).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Perri v. Perri, 608 N.E.2d 790, 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the trial
court could find on remand that the recipient “was not in need of that portion of the alimony, if
any, that directly benefited [the cohabitant], such as the cost of the food for him which she
paid”); Olson v. Olson, 552 N.W.2d 396, 401 (S.D. 1996) (“[A]lthough it would be permissible
for the court to consider any tangible increases in Judy’s expenses arising from her companion’s
residing with her, such as increases in grocery or phone bills, the value of intangibles which do
not actually increase Judy’s living expenses, such as the fair rental value of her home, are
irrelevant.”).
215. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Steinle, 902 P.2d 1372, 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that
the house maintenance and repairs that an alimony recipient’s cohabitant performed could be
considered on remand in determining whether the court should reduce the recipient’s alimony).
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substantial improvement in the recipient spouse’s financial
216
circumstances so as to warrant a modification of maintenance.”
According to the court,
[t]his improvement cannot alone be changed circumstances unless
[courts] are prepared to hold that a former spouse who takes a
roommate to reduce expenses will lose the savings because of an
offsetting reduction in maintenance. Maintenance recipients should
normally retain the benefit of actions they take to live more
217
economically.

States also differ on who has the burden of proving diminished
need. Some require actual evidence that the recipient is benefiting
financially whereas others presume that cohabitation itself reduces
218
the recipient’s need. States in the first group place the burden of
219
establishing diminished need on the party seeking the modification.
Other states, however, create a rebuttable presumption of diminished
need and hold that upon a prima facie showing of cohabitation, the
burden shifts to the alimony recipient to prove that her financial need
220
has not changed.

216. Miller v. Miller, 892 A.2d 175, 185 (Vt. 2005).
217. Id. at 183.
218. AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, § 5.09 cmt. a.
219. See, e.g., Van Dyke, 902 P.2d at 1382 (stating that the “burden does not shift to presume
reduced [financial] need”); In re Marriage of Dwyer, 825 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Colo. App. 1991)
(same); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140, 1142–43 (Me. 1980) (same); Smith v. Smith, 849
P.2d 1097, 1098–99 (Okla. Civ. App. 1992) (same).
220. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 12 So. 3d 572, 575 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (“[P]roof of
cohabitation creates a presumption that a material change in circumstances has occurred. This
presumption will shift the burden to the recipient spouse to come forward with evidence
suggesting that there is no mutual support . . . .” (citation omitted) (quoting Scharwath v.
Scharwath, 702 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Miss. 1997) (en banc)) (internal quotation mark omitted));
Ozolins v. Ozolins, 705 A.2d 1230, 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding, upon a
showing of cohabitation, that “[t]he burden of proof, which is ordinarily on the party seeking
modification, shifts to the dependent spouse”). California creates a rebuttable presumption by
statute. See supra notes 164–165 and accompanying text. The ALI’s Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, AM. LAW INST., supra note 51, likewise
create a rebuttable presumption, see id. § 5.09(3) (“An obligation to make periodic
payments . . . is suspended when the obligor shows that the obligee maintained a ‘common
household’ . . . unless . . . the obligee shows that he or she and the other person do not share ‘a
life together as a couple.’”). Although the ALI argues that treating cohabitation and marriage
differently can lead to “[p]otentially troublesome results,” id. cmt. a, this rebuttable
presumption is inconsistent with the ALI’s explanation of alimony as compensation for
economic losses, see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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IV. HIGHLIGHTING PROBLEMS AND PROPOSING SOLUTIONS
Courts and legislatures addressing the cohabitation question face
three major obstacles. This Part highlights those problems and
221
proposes some solutions. First, there are multiple alimony theories,
and not all of the contemporary theories support modification of
alimony upon cohabitation. Judges should only modify payments
based on an alimony recipient’s cohabitation if the initial court
awarded alimony based on need, as opposed to a different theory.
Second, the meaning of both cohabitation and of diminished need is
often unclear. Courts and legislatures should define these terms
precisely to promote predictability and consistency across awards.
Third, courts and legislatures should consider what happens when
cohabitation ends. In situations when alimony modification is
warranted based on a recipient’s diminished need, a judge should at
most suspend, not terminate, alimony.
A. Grounding Responses to the Cohabitation Question in Theory
As discussed in Part I, courts do not follow a single theoretical
222
model to justify alimony awards. They award alimony for different
reasons in different situations. This practice is reasonable and perhaps
even advantageous so long as judges consider the theoretical basis for
alimony relied upon for the original award when subsequently
deciding whether to modify alimony payments. Judges deciding the
cohabitation question should thus read the order dissolving the
marriage and awarding alimony and determine why a court awarded
223
alimony in the first place. Only if the court awarded alimony based
on need should cohabitation affect alimony payments. Thus, any rule
that would automatically terminate alimony payments upon a finding
of cohabitation, no matter the theoretical basis for the original
alimony award, is not appropriate.
Courts awarding alimony in the twenty-first century generally
base awards on one of several rationales. They may emphasize the
recipient’s need and the supporting spouse’s ability to pay, as courts

221. See supra Part I.B.
222. See supra Part I.B.
223. Ideally, the court that initially awarded alimony would state why it did so. Even without
an explicit statement from the court, however, judges deciding the cohabitation question should
be able to determine the initial court’s reason for awarding alimony based on the circumstances
of the particular case.
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224

have for centuries. Or they may refer to something else that loosely
225
fits under a contract, partnership, or compensation theory. They
may emphasize that the alimony recipient sacrificed career
opportunities to support her spouse while in school, contributed to
the marriage through her work within the home, or cared for the
226
couple’s children and perhaps continues to do so post-divorce.
If judges award alimony on the basis of something other than
need, cohabitation should not be considered when deciding whether
to modify alimony. This practice does not make sense based on the
227
reason that the court awarded alimony in the first place, and it
unfairly punishes an ex-spouse for her post-divorce conduct.
Moreover, Lawrence suggests that penalizing private sexual
behavior—including an ex-spouse’s post-divorce sexual conduct—is
228
unconstitutional. Any portion of an alimony award that is based on
something other than need should not change based on
229
cohabitation.
To the extent that alimony remains need-based and tied to
spousal support, there may be a justification to modify alimony upon
230
cohabitation in certain circumstances. One reason not to eliminate
the cohabitation inquiry altogether is that cohabitation may signal the
existence of a supportive relationship that decreases the alimony
recipient’s financial need. Allowing this inquiry protects former
spouses who pay alimony because they may not know whether
alimony recipients’ needs have changed. Indeed, it is difficult to

224. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
225. See supra Part I.B.2–3.
226. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
227. As discussed in the Introduction, supra, this argument stems from concerns about
consistency and predictability as well as from concerns that courts and legislatures may be more
likely to incorporate moral or other personal judgments in the absence of a theoretical basis for
their decisions. See supra text accompanying note 94.
228. See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
229. Sometimes judges award alimony for multiple reasons. In those cases, judges
addressing the cohabitation question should determine what theories support each part of the
alimony award.
230. Another justification is the fact that jurisdictions generally terminate alimony upon
remarriage. As previously noted, whether alimony should terminate upon remarriage is beyond
the scope of this Note. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. It should be reiterated,
however, that as long as alimony is need-based and tied to spousal support there may be a
justification for terminating alimony on remarriage. But to the extent alimony is based on a
different rationale, such as the economic-damages rationale, that original rationale for awarding
alimony would not suggest that termination of payments upon marriage would be warranted.
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imagine an alimony recipient who would go to the trouble of alerting
her former partner that she needs less alimony.
Although one plausible reason for the automatic-termination
rule is to encourage remarriage, that explanation fails to recognize
two fundamental differences between cohabitation and marriage.
First, unmarried cohabitants do not assume the legal duties of
231
married couples. Indeed, as one state supreme court noted, “[t]he
length of [the cohabiting] relationship is unknown . . . . [A]ny support
[the ex-spouse] may receive from her cohabitant is provided from his
benevolence and comes with no reciprocal or continuing
232
obligation.” Thus, when a cohabiting relationship ends, the exspouse is generally left without a remedy. Second, the
encouragement-of-remarriage explanation ignores the social-science
research that distinguishes cohabitation from marriage. Cohabiting
233
relationships are generally of short duration, and cohabitants may
not share economic expenses to a greater extent than do mere
234
roommates.
Further, automatic-termination rules are overly broad. The
Kentucky Supreme Court feared that an automatic-termination rule
could “open the floodgates to motions to terminate or suspend
maintenance payments in every situation in which the maintenance
recipient has begun dating, or has formed casual relationships with
235
persons of the opposite sex.”
The increasing prevalence of
cohabiting relationships that do not materially affect an alimony
recipient’s underlying financial need would threaten to call a great
236
number of alimony awards into question. To constitute changed
circumstances, the cohabiting relationship should actually approach
the permanency of a marital relationship instead of more closely
237
resembling a more casual dating relationship.

231. In re Marriage of Dwyer, 825 P.2d 1018, 1019 (Colo. App. 1991).
232. Cermak v. Cermak, 569 N.W.2d 280, 284 (N.D. 1997). As the Nevada Supreme Court
noted, “[b]ecause no legal support obligation is imposed on the parties during the relationship,
no spousal maintenance can be awarded when and if the relationship ends. Moreover, absent an
express or implied agreement to the contrary, no quasi-marital property rights accrue as a result
of cohabitation.” Gilman v. Gilman, 956 P.2d 761, 765 (Nev. 1998) (citation omitted).
233. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
235. Combs v. Combs, 787 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Ky. 1990).
236. Miller v. Miller, 892 A.2d 175, 182 (Vt. 2005).
237. Id. Courts can decide whether the cohabiting relationship actually approaches the
permanency of a marital relationship on a case-by-case basis.

MAY IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE COHABITATION QUESTION

10/19/2012 9:38 AM

439

Nor would maintaining separate rules for separate types of
relationships likely contribute to a substantial erosion of the
238
institution of marriage. Other means of financial assistance—such as
certain social-security and pension benefits—treat married people
239
and cohabitants differently, and the institution of marriage remains
strong.
Finally, automatic termination of alimony payments upon a
240
finding of cohabitation has a “distinct punitive aspect.” Merely
living together does not suffice in other contexts, such as when an ex241
spouse moves in with a platonic roommate or with family members.
As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, automatic termination
“imposes upon a former wife the obligation to lead a chaste life lest
242
she forfeit her alimony payments in whole or in part.” Alimony
should not be awarded as a reward or penalty, but instead should
243
rectify economic imbalances between the former spouses.
B. Clearly Defining What Constitutes Cohabitation and Diminished
Need
When courts and legislatures rely on a need-based theory for
alimony, their responses to the cohabitation question should reflect
that policy. They should define cohabitation and diminished need
precisely in order to capture the types of relationships that, under a
need-based theory, warrant alimony modification. Precise definitions
will promote consistency and predictability within jurisdictions.
Unclear definitions, by contrast, could lead judges in similar cases to

238. See Bowman, supra note 101, at 43 (“[O]ffering legal recognition and support to
cohabitants and making their lives easier does not appear to discourage marriage, and in fact the
opposite may be true.”).
239. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
240. Garlinger v. Garlinger, 347 A.2d 799, 802 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
241. See Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support
and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 27 (2003) (“An ex-husband’s protest that his ex-wife
is living with her sister, or even with her best friend would also likely fall on deaf ears. The fact
is that the inquiry as to whether an ex-wife still ‘needs’ the alimony is usually only triggered in
the event that she begins to live with a member of the opposite sex to whom the court assumes
that she is now providing marital-type services.”). But see In re Marriage of Sappington, 478
N.E.2d 376, 380, 382 (Ill. 1985) (terminating the ex-wife’s alimony because her relationship with
her roommate was more akin to that of a husband and wife than of casual friends although the
couple denied having a sexual relationship or any romantic feelings).
242. Garlinger, 347 A.2d at 802.
243. Drummond v. Drummond, 590 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Ark. 1979).
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reach different conclusions about whether parties cohabited or
whether an alimony recipient’s need has diminished.
1. Cohabitation. Courts and legislatures must define carefully
what constitutes cohabitation. Without a workable test, judges may
make determinations that do not have a reasonable theoretical basis
or that do not reflect the social-science data on cohabitation. Unclear
definitions risk unpredictable and inconsistent awards as well as
moral, rather than legal, judgments. Indeed, courts sometimes reach
244
absurd results.
The definition of cohabitation should turn on whether the couple
acts like a family unit. Courts should thus ask whether the
cohabitation resembles a marriage. Although not perfect, the
“marriage-like” test is a reasonable proxy. This approach
acknowledges the interest in protecting the institution of marriage
and highlights relationships that are most likely to include economic
interdependence.
Although this definition affords courts some flexibility, it
excludes dating relationships that likely do not result in diminished
need and instead only captures the type of supportive relationship
that resembles a serious long-term commitment akin to marriage.
Under this definition, simply sleeping together and moving back and
forth between residences does not suffice because this type of
relationship does not suggest permanency and mutual financial
support. And mere roommate relationships do not suffice; indeed,
courts and legislatures should not penalize alimony recipients for
245
their attempts to save money by reducing their living expenses.
There are two reasons to adopt this definition, which excludes
relationships that some courts currently classify as cohabitation. First,
social-science data indicate that non-marital cohabitation is often
246
fluid and usually lasts only a few years. And scholars agree that
cohabitants support each other to a lesser extent than do married
247
couples. If the reason judges should modify alimony is diminished
need, some relationships that are loosely classified as cohabitation do
not fit the bill. Second, cohabitants generally do not incur a legal duty

244. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
245. The Vermont Supreme Court has applied this logic. See supra note 217 and
accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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to support each other either during or after their relationship.
Cohabitants thus do not have the same duty to support one another
as do married couples. The definition of cohabitation should account
for these realities and capture a subset of cohabiting relationships, not
all of them.
Under the marriage-like test, sexual conduct is perhaps helpful in
determining whether two people under the same roof are more than
roommates, but it is not dispositive. Requiring a sexual relationship
for a finding of cohabitation may penalize the ex-spouse for her postdivorce private behavior. Even if looking at sexual conduct during the
marriage is appropriate, sexual conduct is not “meretricious” or
249
“illicit” after the divorce. After the marriage ends, any obligation of
fidelity terminates as well. The better inquiry is thus whether the
couple has a sexual or otherwise intimate, romantic relationship that
looks like the equivalent of a common-law marriage. When the focus
is on economic need, the inquiry should focus on permanency and
financial support, and courts should avoid penalizing post-divorce
sexual conduct.
2. Diminished need. Only cohabitation that results in an actual
decrease in financial need should affect alimony. The research on
cohabitants’ economic interdependence conflicts somewhat, but the
consensus is that cohabitants financially support each other to a lesser
250
extent than do married couples. Vermont’s approach to financial
need thus makes sense: merely sharing household expenses should
251
not suffice to modify alimony. Such inquiries are nitpicky and
unnecessarily intrusive. Alimony recipients should not be forced to
live in isolation, and they should be allowed to share household
expenses as they would with roommates without penalty. And
252
contrary to the holdings of some courts, the fact that an ex-spouse
occasionally pays for a cohabitant’s groceries or other small expenses
does not mean that her financial need has diminished. Establishing
that cohabitants are economically interdependent should require
more than merely showing that they share the type of financial
relationships that ordinary roommates often do.

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132–136 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 216–217 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
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Although cohabitants are less likely to become economically
interdependent than are married couples, a rebuttable presumption
253
that financial needs have changed may work best in practice.
Cohabitants could easily hide evidence of changed financial
circumstances, which could make proving that an alimony recipient’s
needs have diminished very difficult for the other ex-spouse. Yet this
presumption should not be too difficult to overcome. To rebut the
presumption, an alimony recipient could provide evidence that the
couple does not have joint bank accounts, that they pay bills
separately, and that she does not receive financial assistance beyond a
typical roommate relationship. Finally, if cohabitation has occurred
and the recipient’s needs have indeed diminished, the court should
only modify alimony to the extent of the diminished need.
C. Providing for Alimony’s Reinstatement
Courts should at most suspend—not terminate—alimony and
should retain jurisdiction for the length of the original alimony
254
term. They should reinstate alimony payments for the duration of
the original term if the former alimony recipient can establish that she
is no longer cohabiting and is no longer retaining any benefits from
her former cohabitant.
Reinstatement corresponds to two realities. First, cohabitation
255
generally lasts for at most a few years. Second, cohabitants
generally do not incur a legal duty to support each other after their
256
relationship ends. These facts indicate that even if an ex-spouse is
financially supported by her cohabitant, she will likely lose that
support when the relationship ends. Because cohabitants do not incur
a legal duty to support each other, a rule that fails to account for
reinstatement could leave former alimony recipients who were
awarded alimony on the basis of need in precarious financial
circumstances. Reinstatement better protects alimony recipients than
does a termination rule.
The alimony recipient, however, should bear the burden of
proving both that she is no longer cohabiting and no longer retaining

253. A few states already apply a rebuttable presumption in this manner. See supra note 220
and accompanying text.
254. Massachusetts recently adopted this approach. See supra notes 176–179 and
accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text.
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any economic benefits from her former cohabitant in order to receive
a reinstatement of alimony payments. This assignment of the burden
of proof respects the supporting spouse and the fact that he is not in
the best position to know whether the former alimony recipient
retains economic support from her cohabiting relationship. It also
respects the limited resources of courts. Setting a high bar for the
former alimony recipient will likely decrease the number of
unwarranted suits. Moreover, the fact that most alimony awards last
for only a few years—as opposed to a lifetime—also limits the
potential for this rule to overwhelm the courts with requests to
257
reinstate alimony. Finally, because judges make and modify awards
258
in equity, they can prevent unjust results.
CONCLUSION
With the dramatic rise in prevalence and acceptance of
cohabitation, its impact on alimony payments deserves immediate
attention from courts and legislatures. Although different states can,
and perhaps should, tailor their responses to the cohabitation
question based on state policy choices, there are certain underlying
principles that should be applicable given the various theories of
alimony and the social-science data on cohabitation. This Note
provides an initial framework for a sensible, workable set of rules that
respects both ex-spouses. In doing so, it offers three principal
suggestions. First, cohabitation should only affect alimony awards
based on need. Second, courts and legislatures should define
cohabitation and need precisely to capture relationships that
resemble the permanency and mutual financial support of marriage.
And third, courts should at most suspend, not terminate, alimony in
cases of diminished financial need. Although these clarifications do
not answer every aspect of the cohabitation question, this Note seeks
to spark necessary discussion and reform. The social landscape has
changed, and it is time for the law to follow.

257. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

